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ABSTRACT 
 
The South African Government announced, in the 2008 Budget Review, the intention to tax 
the  generation  of  electricity  from  non-renewable  sources  with  2c/kWh.  This  tax  is  to  be 
collected by the producers/generators of electricity at the source. The intention of the tax is to 
serve a dual purpose of managing the potential electricity shortages in South Africa and to 
protect the environment. The primary objective of this paper is to evaluate the impact of an 
electricity generation tax on the international competitiveness of South Africa. Specifically, 
different scenarios are assessed to establish whether the loss of competitiveness can be 
negated through an international, multilateral electricity generation tax.  
 
The  paper  firstly  considers  the  beneficial  impact  of  environmental  taxation  on  the 
competitiveness  of  a  country.  We  subsequently  apply  the  Global  Trade  Analysis  Project 
(GTAP) model to evaluate the impact of an electricity generation tax on the competitiveness 
of South Africa, given multilateral taxes on SACU, SADC and European Union economies. 
 
We simulate the proposed tax as a 10 percent increase in the output price of electricity. We 
assume a closure rule that allows unskilled labour to migrate between sectors and a limited 
skilled  workforce.  As  expected,  a  unilateral  electricity  generation  tax  in  South  Africa  will 
adversely affect the competitiveness of the South African economy and slightly improve the 
competitiveness of the other SACU and SADC economies.  
 
However, if a multilateral tax is imposed throughout the SACU and SADC countries, South 
Africa will experience a marginally greater loss of competitiveness compared to a unilateral 
tax. At the same time the rest of the SACU and SADC countries will experience a loss of 
competitiveness. The benefit of emission reduction in South Africa will also be lower under 
these multilateral tax scenarios. The competitiveness effect on the South African economy as 
well  as  emission  reduction  will  be  more  moderate  under  a  multilateral  South  Africa/EU 
electricity generation tax than under a unilateral South African tax. 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1   The electricity sector in South Africa 
 
The South African Government announced, in the 2008 Budget Review, the intention to tax 
the  generation  of  electricity  from  non-renewable  sources  with  2c/kWh.  This  tax  is  to  be 
collected by the producers/generators of electricity at the source. The intention of the tax is to 
serve the dual purpose of managing the potential electricity shortages in South Africa and to 
protect the environment (Republic of South Africa 2008). 
 
In  2004  South  Africa  contributed  about  1  percent  or  440  metric  ton  (Mt)  of  the  global 
equivalent  carbon  dioxide  (CO2-eq)  produced  in  the  world  (49,000Mt).  The  CO2-eq 
production per capita averaged 5.0t for developing countries, 6.8t for the world and 9.5t for 
South Africa. Whereas African and developing countries emitted less CO2 for a unit of GDP 
than  the  world  average,  South  Africa  emitted  not  only  more  per  capita  than  the  world 
average, but also more than OECD countries. South Africa’s emissions against GDP was 
0.75kg/$, whereas the world average was 0.56kg/$ (Winkler 2007). 
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The electricity sector in South Africa produces 50.6 percent of the national CO2-eq (Blignaut, 
Chitiga-Mabugu and Mabugu 2005). 
 
Table 1: South Africa’s electricity capacity – 2004 
2 
ENERGY SOURCE  CAPACITY (MW)  PERCENT OF TOTAL 
Coal  38 209  88.8 
Nuclear  1 800  4.2 
Bagasse  105  0.2 
Hydro  668  1.6 
Gas turbines  660  1.5 
Pumped storage  1 580  3.7 
Total  43 022  100 
Source: Republic of South Africa 2006 
 
Table  1  illustrates  the  electricity  generation  capacity  of  South  Africa.  The  South  African 
electricity generation is dominated by coal-fired stations (88.8 percent). 
 
South  Africa  is  a  member  of  the  Southern  African  Power  Pool  (SAPP)  which  facilitates 
electricity distribution within SADC.  As shown in Table 2, South Africa was an exporter of 
electricity from 2003 onwards. 
 
Table 2: South African international trade in electricity 
  ELECTRICITY 
GENERATED 
IMPORTS 
GWH 
EXPORTS 
GWH 
NET 
EXPORTS 
2000  210670  4719  4007  -712 
2001  211744  7247  6519  -728 
2002  211546  7873  6950  -923 
2003  211120  6739  10136  3397 
2004  210726  8026  12453  4427 
2005  210160  9199  12884  3685 
2006  209505  9782  13766  3984 
2007  210091  11348  14496  3148 
2008
3  191574  9492  12968  3476 
Source: Republic of South Africa 2009 
 
1.2   South Africa’s relative trade position 
 
A tax on electricity generation in South Africa will affect not only the South African economy, 
but also SACU, SADC, EU and the rest of the world, via changes in South Africa’s export 
and import volumes. This section provides a brief summary of South Africa’s relative trade 
position. 
 
Bilateral  import  shares  for  the  regions  under  consideration  are  shown  in  Table  3.  South 
Africa, despite bordering the rest of the SACU countries, only imports 7.1 percent of total 
imports from the rest of SACU countries and 6.3 percent from the rest of SADC countries. On 
the other hand, South Africa imports 35.7 percent of total imports from the European Union, 
South Africa’s largest trading partner. 
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Table 3: Bilateral import shares 
  SouthAfrica  SACUexclSA  SADCexclSACU  EU_25 
to SouthAfrica  0.0  7.1  6.3  35.7 
to SACUexclSA  6.9  0.1  1.9  55.4 
to SADCexclSACU  6.1  0.7  5.1  42.4 
to EU_25  0.6  0.0  0.1  59.9 
Source: GTAP database 
 
The rest of SACU countries import 6.9 percent of total imports from South Africa, but 55.4 
percent from the European Union. Similarly, the rest of SADC countries import 6.1 percent of 
total imports from South Africa, but 42.4 percent from the European Union. 
 
As  shown  in  table  4,  exports  exhibit  similar  shares,  with  the  European  Union  being  the 
dominating trade partner for South Africa, the rest of SACU countries and the rest of SADC 
countries. 
 
Table 4: Bilateral exports shares 
  SouthAfrica  SACUexclSA  SADCexclSACU  EU_25 
from SouthAfrica  0.0  7.5  5.5  36.2 
from SACUexclSA  7.1  0.1  1.7  55.0 
from SADCexclSACU  6.3  0.7  4.9  41.5 
from EU_25  0.5  0.0  0.1  61.2 
Source: GTAP database 
 
The primary objective of this paper is to evaluate the impact of an electricity generation tax 
on the international competitiveness of South Africa. Also, different scenarios are assessed 
to establish whether the loss of competitiveness can be negated through an international, 
multilateral electricity generation tax.  
 
The next section considers the relationship between environmental taxation and pollution, as 
well  as  the  effect  of  environmental  taxation  on  competitiveness.  In  the  third  section,  the 
model,  data  and simulation  design  are  discussed. This  is followed  by  an  analysis  of  the 
results. The fourth  section  presents  a  conclusion  and  discussion  of the  limitations  of the 
model. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW
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2.1  Introduction 
 
This  section  of  the  paper  considers  the  impact  of  environmental  taxation  on  the 
competitiveness of a country. The fear of loss of competitiveness and the fear of negative 
distributional  impacts  are  currently  the  main  obstacles  to  the  implementation  of 
environmental taxation (OECD 2001).  
 
2.2  Defining environmental taxes 
 
The idea behind environmental taxation is to internalise the externalities caused by polluting 
industries,  which  should  then  fully  reflect  the  negative  impact  of  production  on  the 
environment (OECD 2001).   5 
 
“Putting  an  appropriate  price  on  carbon,  explicitly  through  a  tax  or  trading,  or  implicitly 
through regulation, means that people are faced with the full social cost of their actions. This 
will lead individuals and businesses to switch away from high-carbon goods and services, 
and to invest in low-carbon alternatives.”  
(Stern & The Great Britain Treasury 2006 p xviii) 
 
Environmental taxes were defined by De Kam (2002 p2) as “Any compulsory, unrequited 
payment  to  general  government  levied  on  a  tax  base  deemed  to  be  of  particular 
environmental  relevance”.  Environmental  taxes  are  unrequited  since  the  payments  by 
taxpayers are normally not in proportion to the benefits they receive from government. 
 
Given the definition above, environmental taxes can only be successfully implemented if the 
following two principles of taxation are considered (De Kam 2002): 
 
·  A tax will, as long as it affects the incentives of economic agents, creates distortions 
in the economy that will lead to a reduction of economic efficiency. However, these 
distortions might be introduced into the system to correct market failures and thereby 
enhance  welfare.  Also, where  the  price  elasticity  of  demand  is relatively  inelastic, 
there will be substantial revenue gains; this might be used to offset distortions cause 
dby other taxes. In such a situation, a double dividend becomes possible. 
·  The direct effect of the tax should be assessed as it will impact on the distribution of 
income and create questions about fairness. According to De Kam (2002), this issue  
of  redistribution  should  be  awarded  substantial  weight  even  if  it  lowers  economic 
efficiency. 
 
The OECD (2001) found, over the past couple of decades, that environmental taxes could be 
effective  and  efficient  instruments  for  environmental  policy  to  reduce  pollution.  These 
measures, through their price signals to the economy, ensure that polluters take into account 
the detrimental impact of their production and consumption decisions on the environment 
(OECD  2001).  Environmental  improvements  are  achieved  through  price  increases  of 
environmentally harmful products. These price increases reduce the quantity demanded of 
the product. The idea is that the most efficient and cheapest abatement could be achieved if 
marginal abatement costs are equalised across all agents (University of Pretoria (UP) 2007). 
 
However,  most  stakeholders  will  agree  that  the  optimal  environmental  effectiveness  and 
economic efficiency of environmentally related taxes have not been achieved due to existing 
exemptions and other special provisions. Two main political concerns hamper the scaling 
back of these obstacles, namely, the fear of loss of competitiveness and the fear of negative 
distributional impacts (OECD 2001). As a result, the negative environmental impacts caused 
by production and consumption are not fully reflected in the economy. 
 
2.3  The effect of environmental taxes on competitiveness  
 
International competitiveness 
 
The definition of “international competitiveness” is not clear in the literature. Krugman (1994) 
claims that competitiveness is a dangerous obsession when applied to countries, as opposed 
to companies. International trade is not a zero-sum game, and countries do not compete 
directly  in  the  same  way  as  companies  (Krugman  1994).  Golub  (2000  p8)  defined 
competitiveness as a “favourable business climate, sometimes measured by a composite 
score of a series of indicators: structural and macroeconomic policies, basic infrastructure, 
education, labour market rigidities, etc.”. This definition is in line with the approach of the 
competitiveness rankings of the World Economic Forum. 
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The  concept  of  competitiveness  has  several  different  levels  (UP  2007).  It  is  therefore 
important  to  distinguish  between  the  competitiveness  of  an  entire  country  and  the 
competitiveness of individual firms and sectors. As long as a company or sector is able to 
compete  in  international  markets,  and  earn  an  adequate  rate  of  return;  the  company  or 
sector  could  be  seen  as  competitive.    On  the  other  hand,  competitiveness  for  an  entire 
country  is  more  complex  to  define.  Environmental  taxes  are  intended  to  correct  market 
failures. If this is achieved, overall economic efficiency in the economy increases. However, 
certain sectors will face higher production costs and will therefore be adversely affected. If 
there is a revenue recycling scheme in place and recycling takes place through a reduction in 
labour taxes, labour intensive industries will tend to gain at the expense of energy intensive 
sectors (De Kam 2002). 
 
The different dimensions of competitiveness are described in Table 5.  
 
Table 5: The different dimensions of competitiveness 
  INDIVIDUAL FIRM  COUNTRY 
Definition  Able to compete in 
international markets, with 
an adequate rate of return. 
Favourable business climate, while 
correcting for market failures, resulting in 
an improvement in the overall economic 
outcome. 
Relative 
Performance 
If uncompetitive, risk losing 
market share and eventually 
close down. 
If uncompetitive, grow more slowly and 
enjoy fewer opportunities than more 
competitive countries. 
Environmental 
Tax  
Impact on the bottom-line.  Impact on the overall performance of the 
economy 
Source: Republic of South Africa 2008 
 
The second dimension of competitiveness is relative performance, in terms of individual firms 
and countries. A firm that is uncompetitive is at risk to lose market share, or to close down. 
However,  a  country  cannot  close  down.  But  countries  with  low  competitiveness  could 
experience slower than optimal economic growth, with lower real wage growth and fewer 
economic opportunities than more competitive countries (Stern 2006). On a country level, 
improving competitiveness would entail new policies and revamping institutions to enable the 
economy to adapt more freely to changing environments and exploiting new opportunities. 
This  should  include  measures  to  improve  national  productivity.  National  competitiveness 
could  further  be  enhanced  through  environmental  measures  that  encourage  emission 
mitigation, if these measures are carefully designed and if these measures provide incentives 
to innovate. Therefore, innovation associated with countering climate change could stimulate 
global economic growth (Stern 2006). 
 
Environmental taxes and competitiveness 
 
When  implementing  environmental taxes,  the  objectives  of  these  taxes  should  be  clearly 
stated  at  the  onset  (OECD  2001).  An  environmental  tax  will  have  an  impact  on  the 
competitiveness of certain industries, especially energy intensive industries. According to the 
OECD (2001), due to the influence and large interests of industry, energy taxes cannot be 
introduced without significant exemptions and other special provisions to reduce the burden 
on at least the worst hit sectors. Exemptions and other special provisions could be inefficient 
if  the  unilateral  imposition  of  environmental  taxes  creates  a  possibility  for  leakage.  Also, 
exemptions and special provisions differ in the way in which they affect the original emission 
reduction incentives of the tax. The most efficient emission reduction could be achieved if 
equal  tax  rates  are  levied  on  all  agents  and  then  compensate  the  worst  hit  sectors 
separately. If this is not possible, low tax rates that are raised slowly over time could be 
levied in these sectors as opposed to complete exemptions or zero-rates (UP 2007).   7 
 
However,  exemptions  create  inefficiencies  in  pollution  abatement  and  run  contrary  to  the 
objective of environmental taxes, that is, the polluter should pay principle. 
 
Potential loss of competitiveness 
 
Popular view dictates that trade liberalisation will shift power from governments to firms, thus 
making it easier for firms to resist costly environmental regulation. This becomes possible if 
firms  refer  to  their  need  to  stay  competitive.  However,  the  argument  will  only  hold  if 
environmental measures decrease the competitiveness of firms and governments respond 
by setting less stringent environmental policies (Greaker 2004). 
 
De Kam (2002) reported that environmental taxes imposed in OECD countries did not reduce 
the  competitiveness  of  industries  within  these  countries.  This  might  be  due  to  partial 
exemption provided to energy intensive industries in these countries. In fact, it is clear from 
the OECD/EU database that environmentally-related taxes are almost exclusively levied on 
households and the transport sector (De Kam 2002). 
 
However,  the  OECD  (2001)  indicated  that  economic  instruments,  used  for  pollution 
abatement  purposes  are  likely  to  have  detrimental  effects  on  the  international 
competitiveness  of  certain  industries,  especially  if  these  instruments  are  implemented 
through  a  unilateral  policy  decision.  This  is  because  a  unilateral  environmental  tax  will 
increase  the  production  cost  in  the  country  imposing  the  tax,  thus  forcing  the  prices  of 
domestically  produced  products  traded  in  the  international  market  to  higher  levels.  As  a 
result, exports will become less attractive and imports more so. This will lead in the short run 
to lower domestic production, potential job losses and other adjustments caused by the tax in 
the economy (De Kam 2002). 
 
Competitiveness concerns are expected to be the strongest if the environmentally-related tax 
is imposed on internationally traded goods or key factors of production, and these goods or 
factors are freely traded with no border tax adjustment in place. Another critical factor is 
substitution possibilities. If there is limited scope for the identification and financing of cleaner 
production processes and technologies, the inability to substitute away from environmental 
taxes will adversely impact on the competitiveness of affected industries (De Kam 2002). On 
the  other  hand,  competitiveness  effects  are  not  likely  to  be  a  major  concern  if  the 
environmental tax is levied on the production of a product that cannot be readily imported or 
exported, and substitution is possible as well as relatively cheap. 
 
According to Stern (2006), in the case of a unilateral tax, the potential impact on a small 
number of industries is such that leakage becomes possible. In other words, even if these 
sectors  are  not  characterised  by  high  trade  intensity,  there  are  incentives  for  import 
substitution  and  to  relocate  production  to  countries  with  less  stringent  environmental 
regulation. Therefore, some sectors (for example, steel and cement or even electricity for 
more  inter-connected  countries)  might  be  more  vulnerable  where  countries  border  other 
countries with less stringent mitigation regulation (Stern 2006). 
 
Potential gain of competitiveness 
 
There is also some evidence in the literature that suggests that environmentally-related taxes 
could increase the competitiveness of a country imposing the tax. For example, the Porter-
hypothesis  states:  “Governments  can  tighten  their  level  of  environmental  regulation,  and 
firms will find that they become more competitive, not less” (Porter 1991). This hypothesis 
could  be  interpreted  in  at  least  two  different  ways.  Firstly,  emissions  can  be  seen  as  a 
wasteful use of scarce resources. Scarce resources are transformed to pollution as a by-
product of production. According to Porter and Von der Linde (1995) this could be seen as a   8 
sign that these resources are used in an incomplete, inefficient or ineffective manner. If these 
emissions  are  removed  from  the  system,  efficiency  gains  will  be  made  as  less  scarce 
resources will be needed to produce final goods (Porter and Von der Linde 1995). Secondly, 
if stringent regulation is implemented in the correct manner, firms in tax paying countries 
could become more competitive than firms in countries without the same type of taxation. In 
other words, a tough environmental policy makes firms more internationally competitive than 
a weak environmental policy (Porter 1991). 
 
Greaker (2003) referred to the scale advantages of abatement technology when he stated 
that  emissions  may  be  an  inferior  input  in  production.  He  also  provided  evidence  that 
governments  could  exploit  this  in  the  international  market  place  through  setting  a  high 
emissions tax. 
 
In 2004, Greaker supported the Porter-hypothesis by illustrating the possibility of improved 
downstream competitiveness due to tough environmental policies. Entry into the abatement 
services  industry  is  expected  to  increase  under  tough  environmental  policies.  This  is 
expected  to  lead  to  a  lower  price  on  pollution  abatement  and  consequently  a  more 
competitive polluting industry. Thus, Greaker (2004) proposed that governments should set 
an  especially  stringent  environmental  policy.  However,  this  argument  is  only  valid  if  the 
environmental policy is unilateral in nature. In other words, this incentive to set a stringent 
environmental  policy  will  disappear  if  there  is  a  global  market  for  pollution  abatement 
services. 
 
Along  the  same  line  of  argument,  stringent  environmental  taxes  could  also  increase  firm 
competitiveness,  since  higher  emission  taxes  lead  to  a  reduction  of marginal  costs. This 
would be the case if emissions per unit of output decrease due to increased spending on 
research and development and if this effect dominates the direct effect of the environmental 
tax  (Ulph  1994).It  remains  ambiguous  to  which  extent  governments  should  set  a  high 
emissions tax to exploit this relationship. 
 
Computable General Equilibrium model results for South Africa 
 
Van Heerden, Blignaut and Jordaan (2008) modelled a 10 percent increase in the price of 
electricity in South Africa. The aim was to determine the effect of such an increase on the 
consumer  price  index.  A  computable  general  equilibrium  model  of  the  Department  of 
Economics at the University of Pretoria, UPGEM, was used in the study. The official 1998 
Social  Accounting  Matrix  of  South  Africa,  which  divided  households  into  48  groups  and 
recorded 27 sectors, was used in the database. The UPGEM model’s closure reflected a 
short-run time horizon. They found the direct impacts of an electricity generation tax on the 
economy to be mostly negative.  
 
The model presented in this study simulates an equivalent increase in electricity prices, but 
looks  not  only  at  the  South  African  economy,  but  also  SACU,  SADC  and  the  European 
Union. Furthermore, a unilateral and multilateral tax is simulated to examine the possibility of 
negating the adverse competitiveness effects through multilateral tax implementation. The 
model  also  provides  a  detailed  breakdown  on  industry  level,  and  distinguishes  between 
unskilled and skilled labour. This analysis should enable policy makers to assess the impact 
of  the  proposed  electricity  generation  tax,  whether  unilateral  or  multilateral,  on  an 
international, national and industry level. 
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3.  MODEL AND DATA 
 
3.1  The GTAP model 
 
The  multi-region  computable  general  equilibrium  Global  Trade  Analysis  (GTAP)  model  is 
designed  for  comparative-static  analysis  of  trade  policy  issues.  All  GTAP  datasets  are 
represented in three primary datasets namely: the set of regions and countries, the set of 
produced commodities and sectors, and the set of primary factors (Rutherford and Paltsev 
2000). The version of the model used in this paper distinguishes five regions, shown in Table 
6, and the 57 GTAP sectors has been aggregated into 11 sectors shown in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. In addition to the 11 sectors, there are three other agents in each region: a capital 
creator, a household and the government.  
 
Table 6: Regional aggregation of GTAP 
IDENTIFIER  COUNTRIES IN REGION 
South Africa  South Africa 
SACUexclSA  Lesotho, Swaziland, Namibia and Botswana 
SADCexclSACU  Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Mauritius, Angola, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, 
the DRC and Madagascar 
EU_25  Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom 
Restofworld  The rest of the world 
 
The  GTAP  model  mediates  between  world  savings  and  investment  through  the  explicit 
modelling of international transport margins and a global bank. Also, differential price and 
income responsiveness across countries are captured through a consumer demand system 
(Hertel and Will 1999). 
 
The  common  base  year  for  the  GTAP  7  database,  as  used  in  this  paper,  is  2004  and 
macroeconomic data is used to update the regional input-output tables. All the coefficients in 
these updated regional input-output tables are then scaled-up to external GDP data, in 2004 
US dollars, from the initial national currency units. Then, gross capital formation, government 
consumption and private consumption are used to update the values of these aggregates in 
the regional input-output tables (Hertel 1997). 
 
GTAP  optimises  the  behaviour  of  agents  in  competitive  markets  to  determine  regional 
supplies and demands of goods and services. This behaviour will also determine the sector 
demands for primary factors, i.e. natural resources, capital, land and labour. There is skilled 
labour,  unskilled  labour  and  a  single,  homogenous  capital  good  in  each  region.  In  the 
standard comparative static applications of the model, total supplies of all primary factors are 
fixed in each region. For the applications reported here, we adopt a different treatment, with 
unskilled labour allowed to move across regions to eliminate any initial disturbances created 
in the unskilled labour market, but we fix skilled labour with a variable skilled wage rate. 
Given the limited supply of skilled labour in the skilled labour market and the high structural 
unemployment  in  the  unskilled  labour  market,  this  treatment  will  be  a  more  accurate 
description of the South African economy than the standard comparative static applications. 
 
Other key assumptions: 
 
·  The entire final demand system is treated as the demand system of a representative 
household. Therefore, it is not possible to analyse the welfare effects of a unilateral or   10 
multilateral tax on different households as there is effectively only one household in 
the model. 
 
·  It  is  assumed  that  nominal  savings  as  well  as  private  and  public  consumption 
expenditures in each region move with regional income. Furthermore, if there is a 
change  in  rates  of  return  on  capital,  national  investment  will  respond.  Global 
investment is fixed. Therefore, a region that benefits the most from an exogenous 
shock will increase its share of global investment, at the expense of other regions that 
benefit less. 
 
·  Capital stocks are fixed in these simulations. However, rates of return are allowed to 
vary and this assumption will accommodate the unchanged capital. 
 
·  It  is  also  assumed  that  all  technology  variables  are  unchanged.  Therefore,  an 
increase in the price of electricity will have no impact on the technology used in the 
electricity generation industry. 
 
·  Lastly, exogenously imposed shocks in each scenario will have no effect on 
commodity tax rates, other than those used to impose the shock. 
 
3.2  The GTAP database 
 
The GTAP  database  comprises  of  bilateral  trade  data  derived  from  United  Nations  trade 
statistics, input-output data for each region and other support and protection data derived 
from  various  sources.  Documentation  for  the  Version  6  data  set  is  given  in  Dimaranan 
(2006). However, the simulations reported in this research study are based on a preliminary 
release of Version 7 of the database, which contains estimates of production costs, final 
demand values, bilateral trade values and various tax levels for 2005.  
 
3.3  Simulation design 
 
The version described in the previous section is used to model different scenarios. In the first 
scenario, South Africa imposes a unilateral 2c/kWh tax on electricity generation. Changes in 
trade volumes are those linked to a 2c/kWh increase in the tariff, which is equivalent to a 
sector-wide weighed average of 10 percent (Blignaut, Chitiga-Mabugu and Mabugu 2005). 
The second and third scenarios model the effects of a 10 percent electricity generation tax in 
SACU  and  SADC  respectively.  The  fourth  scenario  models  a  10  percent  electricity 
generation  tax  in  South  Africa  and  the  European  Union.  The  reason  for  the  last  three 
simulations is to investigate to the possibility that the negative competitiveness impact of 
environmental  taxes  could  be  negated  through  multilateral  implementation  instead  of 
unilateral implementation. 
 
Since an output tax drives a wedge between the price received by producers and the price 
paid in the market, we imposed the shocks via changes to output taxes in the production of 
electricity.  
 
4.  RESULTS 
 
This paper considers the impact of unilateral and multilateral electricity generation taxes of 
2c/kWh on competitiveness, under the four scenarios discussed in the previous section. Note 
that revenue neutrality was also simulated and the results reflected no significant differences 
from the results reported below. 
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Under  the  first  scenario,  South  Africa  imposed  a  unilateral  2c/kWh  tax  on  electricity 
generation. The results of this simulation have been discussed in Seymore et al (2009), and 
are summarised in Table 7. 
 
Table 7: Results of Scenario 1 
  SouthAfrica  SACUexclSA  SADCexclSACU  EU_25  restofworld 
Real GDP  -0.28  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00 
Real private consumption  -0.40  0.06  0.02  0.00  0.00 
Real public consumption  -0.17  0.03  0.01  0.00  0.00 
Real investment  -2.29  0.12  0.07  0.01  0.01 
Real import volume  -0.69  0.13  0.04  0.00  0.00 
Real export volume  0.70  0.02  0.00  0.00  -0.01 
Terms of Trade  -0.15  0.06  0.02  0.00  0.00 
Unskilled employment  -0.77  0.07  0.01  0.00  0.00 
Skilled employment wages  -0.63  0.07  0.04  0.00  0.00 
 
Higher production costs will result in terms of trade deterioration of 0.15 percent for South 
Africa. However, the decrease in domestic demand will outweigh the decrease in domestic 
production. Therefore, contrary to the expected outcome, despite the higher production costs 
and weaker terms of trade, the real export volume increases by 0.7 percent and the real 
import volume decreases by 0.69 percent. The industry breakdown is presented in Appendix 
A2.  
 
Table 8: Results of Scenario 2 
  SouthAfrica  SACUexclSA  SADCexclSACU  EU_25  restofworld 
Real GDP  -0.28  -0.09  0.01  0.00  0.00 
Real private consumption  -0.40  -0.09  0.03  0.00  0.00 
Real public consumption  -0.18  -0.08  0.01  0.00  0.00 
Real investment  -2.30  -0.35  0.09  0.01  0.01 
Real import volume  -0.70  0.13  0.06  0.00  0.00 
Real export volume  0.70  0.21  -0.01  0.00  -0.01 
Terms of Trade  -0.15  0.04  0.03  0.00  0.00 
Unskilled employment  -0.77  -0.25  0.02  0.00  0.00 
Skilled employment wages  -0.63  -0.22  0.05  0.00  0.00 
 
The second scenario modelled the effects of a 10 percent electricity generation tax in South 
Africa  and  the  rest  of  SACU.  The  macroeconomic  results  for  South  Africa  remained  the 
same, except for a marginal greater decrease in real public consumption, real investment 
and real import volume. Real investment decreased by 2.3 percent in stead of 2.29 percent. 
South  Africa  is  seen  as  the  gateway  to  Africa  for  many  multinational  organisations.  A 
decrease in the real GDP of other SACU countries might deter real investment in South 
Africa.  In  fact,  a  multilateral  tax  as  modelled  in  scenario  2  will  result  in  a  0.09  percent 
decrease in the real GDP of other SACU nations.  
 
For  the  rest  of  SACU,  the  multilateral  tax  under  scenario  2  will  adversely  affect  all  the 
macroeconomic variables, except international trade. The terms of trade, calculated as the 
ratio between export prices and import prices, are expected to improve by 0.04 percent, and 
as  a  result,  exports  are  expected  to  increase  0.21  percent  and  imports  to  increase  0.13 
percent. The terms of trade for the rest of SACU can be expected to improve. The reason for   12 
this is the prominent role that South Africa plays in trade with these countries (see section 2). 
Since the adverse effects of electricity generation taxes is greater in South Africa than in the 
rest  of  SACU  (Table  8),  the  relative  trade  position  of  the  rest  of  SACU  is  expected  to 
improve. 
 
 
As expected, the impact on the European Union and the rest of the world is insignificant. But, 
the effect on the rest of SADC is mostly positive. The only macroeconomic variable decrease 
experienced by the rest of SADC is a 0.01 percent decrease in real export volume. This is 
due to the greater relative improvement of the rest of SACU’s terms of trade (0.04 percent) 
compared to 0.03 percent in the rest of SADC.  
 
The results of scenario 3 are presented in Table 9. A multilateral tax in all SACU and SADC 
countries will affect South Africa more negatively than a unilateral tax in South Africa only. 
The South African deterioration in terms of trade (-0.16 percent) and the weaker demand in 
the  rest  of  SACU  (-0.11  percent  decrease  in  real  private  consumption  and  -0.1  percent 
decrease  in  public  consumption)  and  the  rest  of  SADC  (-0.74  percent  decrease  in  real 
private  consumption  and  -0.16  percent  decrease  in  public  consumption)  will  result  in  a 
decrease of 0.74 percent in the real import volume. Exports will increase by 0.69 percent 
compared to 0.7 percent under scenario 1. Also, real investment decreases by 2.33 percent 
and unskilled employment by 0.78 percent. 
 
Table 9: Results of Scenario 3 
  SouthAfrica  SACUexclSA  SADCexclSACU  EU_25  restofworld 
Real GDP  -0.28  -0.10  -0.54  0.00  0.00 
Real private consumption  -0.41  -0.11  -0.74  0.00  0.00 
Real public consumption  -0.18  -0.10  -0.16  0.00  0.00 
Real investment  -2.33  -0.37  -3.13  0.01  0.01 
Real import volume  -0.74  0.08  -1.22  0.00  0.00 
Real export volume  0.69  0.18  0.13  -0.01  -0.01 
Terms of Trade  -0.16  0.02  -0.11  0.00  0.00 
Unskilled employment  -0.78  -0.28  -1.03  0.00  0.00 
Skilled employment wages  -0.63  -0.24  -0.11  0.00  0.00 
 
Furthermore,  all  other  SACU  and  SADC  countries  will  be  adversely  affected  with  the 
exception of the rest of SACU and the rest of SADC’s international trade position. Again, this 
improvement  is  due  to  the  relative  position  of  the  rest  of  SACU  and  the  rest  of  SADC 
countries to South Africa. Thus, contrary to the idea that multilateral taxation will negate the 
effect of an electricity generation tax in South Africa, multilateral taxation will reinforce the 
negative effects of a unilateral electricity generation tax on the South African economy.  
 
Table 10: Results of Scenario 4 
  SouthAfrica  SACUexclSA  SADCexclSACU  EU_25  restofworld 
Real GDP  -0.26  0.02  0.02  -0.37  0.02 
Real private consumption  -0.38  0.03  0.06  -0.50  0.04 
Real public consumption  0.16  0.00  0.01  -0.24  0.03 
Real investment  -1.67  0.37  0.62  -1.09  0.40 
Real import volume  -0.61  0.12  0.18  -0.55  0.17 
Real export volume  0.42  -0.05  -0.15  0.05  -0.25 
Terms of Trade  -0.13  -0.01  0.07  -0.06  0.04   13 
Unskilled employment  -0.74  0.08  0.02  -0.91  0.06 
Skilled employment wages  -0.61  0.03  0.13  -0.72  0.04 
 
Scenario 4 modelled a multilateral electricity generation tax of 10 percent in South Africa and 
the European Union. From the results in Table 10, it can be seen that a simultaneous tax in 
both regions will have a smaller negative effect on the South African economy, compared to 
a  unilateral  tax  in  South  Africa  only  (Table  7).  This  is  in  line  with  expectations  as  the 
European Union is the largest trading partner of South Africa, an the loss of competitiveness 
to  the  European  Union,  will  under  this  scenario,  be  negated.  However,  the  cost  to  the 
European Union will be significant. 
 
CO2 abatement benefit: South Africa 
 
The CO2 abatement has been calculated, using the greenhouse gas emissions inventory as 
developed by Blignaut, Chitiga-Mabugu and Mabugu (2005). Economic benefit accruing to 
CO2 abatement was calculated at R100 per ton, based on a low estimate of approximately 
Euro  8  for  a  Certifiable  Emission  Reduction  certificate.  As  reflected  in  Table  11,  the 
imposition of a unilateral electricity generation tax will lead to a reduction in CO2 emissions 
worth R970 million. If the electricity generation tax is imposed multilaterally across all SACU 
or all SADC countries, the benefit of a reduction in emissions will be reduced to R962 million 
and R933 million respectively. Furthermore, if the electricity tax is levied in South Africa and 
the European Union, emission reduction will be worth R626 million. 
 
Table 11: CO2 abatement benefit: South Africa  
Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4   
CO2  Benefit 
(R 
million’s) 
CO2  Benefit 
(R 
million’s) 
CO2  Benefit 
(R 
million’s) 
CO2  Benefit 
(R 
million’s) 
Electricity  -9.49  948.68  -9.40  939.84  -9.11  911.09  -5.97  597.07 
Grains and crops  0.02  -2.44  0.02  -2.44  0.02  -2.12  0.02  -1.57 
 
Livestock and meat 
products  0.00  0.14  0.00  0.16  0.00  0.17  0.00  0.21 
Mining and extraction  -0.03  2.75  -0.03  2.75  -0.03  2.67  -0.04  3.54 
Processed food  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Textiles and clothing  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Light Manufacturing  0.02  -1.94  0.02  -1.78  0.01  -1.46  0.01  -0.81 
Heavy Manufacturing  -0.18  18.41  -0.18  18.41  -0.17  17.39  -0.20  20.45 
Utilities and 
construction  -0.05  4.82  -0.05  4.85  -0.05  4.90  -0.04  3.57 
Transport and 
communication  0.00  -0.45  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  -0.03  3.15 
Other services  0.00  0.50  -0.01  0.52  -0.01  0.52  -0.01  0.55 
Total  -9.70  970.48  -9.62  962.31  -9.33  933.17  -6.26  626.16 
 
A multilateral electricity generation tax across SACU or SADC countries will not only have a 
marginal  negative  effect  on  the  South  African  economy,  but  also  result  in  emission 
reductions lower than in the case of a unilateral electricity generation tax. As expected, a 
multilateral electricity generation tax in South Africa and the European Union will not only 
have a smaller negative effect on the competitiveness of South Africa, but also lead to lower 
emission reductions than under a unilateral electricity generation tax. Since the multilateral 
electricity  generation  tax  limits  the  negative  competitiveness  effect  on  the  South  African 
economy,  production  decreases  are  smaller  than  under  a  unilateral  tax,  leading  to  lower 
emission reductions. 
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A sensitivity analysis has been conducted on the price elasticity of demand for electricity in 
the South African economy, the rest of SACU, the rest of SADC, the European Union and the 
Rest of the World. The elasticities have been found to be robust at a 10 percent variation 
using the Stroud quadrature method.  
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The South African Government announced, in the 2008 Budget Review, the intention to tax 
the  generation  of  electricity  from  non-renewable  sources  with  2c/kWh.  This  tax  is  to  be 
collected by the producers/generators of electricity at the source. The intention of the tax is to 
serve a dual purpose of managing the potential electricity shortages in South Africa and to 
protect the environment (Republic of South Africa 2008). 
 
The  primary  objective  of  this  paper  was  to  evaluate  the  impact  of  such  an  electricity 
generation tax on the international competitiveness of South Africa. Also, different scenarios 
were assessed to establish whether the loss of competitiveness could be negated through an 
international, multilateral electricity generation tax.  
 
Literature confirms that an environmental tax will have an impact on the competitiveness of a 
country.  Four  scenarios  were  modelled.  Under  the  first  scenario,  South  Africa  imposed 
unilaterally  a  2c/kWh  tax  on  electricity  generation,  the  next  two  scenarios  considered  a 
multilateral  tax  in  all  the  SACU  countries,  followed  by  a  multilateral  tax  in  all  the  SADC 
countries. The last scenario looked at a 10 percent electricity tax in both South Africa and the 
European Union.  
 
It was shown that an electricity generation tax will indeed affect the competitiveness of South 
Africa in a negative way. Furthermore, SACU and SADC wide implementation will marginally 
reinforce  these  negative  effects.  However,  a  multilateral  electricity  generation  tax  across 
SACU or SADC countries will result in emission reductions, but lower than in the case of a 
unilateral electricity generation tax.  
 
In contrast, the cost to the South African economy could be limited, if the European Union 
would  follow  suit  and  implement  an  electricity  generation tax.  As  expected,  a  multilateral 
electricity generation tax in South Africa and the European Union will have a smaller negative 
effect on the competitiveness of South Africa. But, on the other hand, also lead to lower 
emission reductions than under a unilateral electricity generation tax. Therefore, one could 
argue in favour of global rules for environmental taxes, this will ensure minimum negative 
competitiveness effects on participating countries. 
 
It is important to note that the GTAP analysis presented in this paper has some limitations. 
The  entire  final  demand  system  is  treated  as  the  demand  system  of  a  representative 
household. Since there is effectively only one household in the model, it is not possible to 
analyse the welfare effects of the tax on different households. Also, GTAP as a multi-country 
model focuses on the interaction between countries resulting from the flow of goods and 
services. As a result, the savings and investment linkages are relatively weak and do not pick 
up  any  potential  shifts  in  financial  or  physical  assets,  flowing  from  the  imposition  of  an 
electricity generation tax across borders. 
 
The emergence of new industries cannot be predicted in GTAP. These new industries, such 
as coal generation with carbon capture and storage, must be exogenously introduced, with 
the size as well as timing being specified by the modeller. In this study it was assumed that 
no new industries will emerge as a result of the electricity generation tax. Thus the impact 
analysis is a relatively short to medium term analysis. 
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The GTAP version used in this paper is comparative static. Thus, an analysis of the inter-
temporal  linkages  between  savings  and  consumption,  and  investment  and  capital  is  not 
possible. Also, there is no endogenous mechanism to project the time-pattern of investment 
changes. However, GTAP is able to project the likely changes resulting from an electricity 
generation tax on capital formation by region and industry. A comparative-static model also 
prevents a analysis of the short term and long term adjustment costs associated with an 
electricity tax.   
 
The possible effects of climate change have not been included in the simulations discussed 
in this paper. There are no assumptions made about the possible costs under ‘business as 
usual’, as a result of climate change.    16 
APPENDIX 
 
       Table A1: Sectoral aggregation of GTAP 
 
Identifier  Sectors in Region 
Electricity  Electricity 
Grains and crops  Paddy rice 
Wheat 
Cereal grains nec 
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 
Oil seeds 
Sugar cane, sugar beet 
Processed rice 
 
Livestock and meat 
products 
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses 
Animal products nec 
Raw milk 
Wool, silk-worm cocoons 
Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse 
Meat products nec 
Mining and extraction  Forestry and fishing 
Coal 
Oil and gas 
Mineral nc 
Processed food  Vegetable oils and fats 
Dairy products 
Sugar 
Food products nec 
Beverages and tobacco products 
Textiles and clothing  Textiles 
Wearing apparel 
Light Manufacturing  Leather products 
Wood products 
Paper products, publishing 
Metal products 
Motor vehicles and parts 
Transport equipment nec 
Manufactures nec 
Heavy Manufacturing  Petroleum, coal products 
Chemical, rubber, plasticprods 
Mineral products nec 
Ferrous metals 
Metals nec 
Electronic equipment 
Machinery and equipment nec 
Utilities and 
construction 
Gas manufacture, distribution 
Water 
Construction 
Transport and 
communication 
Trade 
Transport nec 
Sea transport 
Air transport 
Communication 
Other services  Financial services nec 
Insurance 
Business services nec 
Recreation and other services 
Public Admin, defence, health, education 
Dwellings 
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Table A2: Scenario 1 industry results 
  SouthAfrica  SACUexclSA  SADCexclSACU  EU_25  restofworld 
Electricity  -4.29  1.47  0.45  0.04  0.01 
Grains and crops  0.31  -0.07  -0.02  -0.01  0.00 
 
Livestock and meat products 
-0.08  -0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Mining and extraction  -0.35  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Processed food  0.01  -0.06  -0.02  0.00  0.00 
Textiles and clothing  0.34  0.15  -0.02  0.00  -0.01 
Light Manufacturing  0.12  -0.29  -0.14  0.00  0.00 
Heavy Manufacturing  -0.18  0.01  -0.09  0.00  0.00 
Utilities and construction  -1.84  0.10  0.06  0.01  0.01 
Transport and communication  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Other services  -0.19  0.04  0.01  0.00  0.00 
 
Table A3: Scenario 2 industry results 
 
  SouthAfrica  SACUexclSA  SADCexclSACU  EU_25  restofworld 
Electricity  -4.25  -7.70  0.66  0.04  0.01 
Grains and crops  0.31  -0.02  -0.02  -0.01  0.00 
 
Livestock and meat products 
-0.09  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Mining and extraction  -0.35  0.16  -0.01  0.00  0.00 
Processed food  0.01  -0.01  -0.03  0.00  0.00 
Textiles and clothing  0.34  0.21  -0.05  0.00  -0.01 
Light Manufacturing  0.11  -0.29  -0.16  0.00  0.00 
Heavy Manufacturing  -0.18  0.08  -0.12  0.00  0.00 
Utilities and construction  -1.85  -0.31  0.07  0.01  0.01 
Transport and communication  0.00  -0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Other services  -0.2  -0.05  0.00  0.00  0.00 
 
 
Table A4: Scenario 3 industry results 
  SouthAfrica  SACUexclSA  SADCexclSACU  EU_25  restofworld 
Electricity  -4.12  -6.02  -9.77  0.06  0.02 
Grains and crops  0.27  -0.07  0.41  -0.01  -0.01 
 
Livestock and meat products 
-0.10  -0.02  -0.30  0.00  0.00 
Mining and extraction  -0.34  0.16  0.37  0.00  0.00 
Processed food  -0.02  -0.06  0.35  -0.01  0.00 
Textiles and clothing  0.34  0.19  3.49  -0.01  -0.01 
Light Manufacturing  0.09  -0.33  -0.12  0.00  0.00 
Heavy Manufacturing  -0.17  0.03  -4.26  0.00  0.00 
Utilities and construction  -1.87  -0.32  -2.32  0.01  0.01 
Transport and communication  0.00  -0.08  -0.06  0.00  0.00 
Other services  -0.20  -0.07  0.10  0.00  0.00   18 
 
 
Table A5: Scenario 4 industry results 
  SouthAfrica  SACUexclSA  SADCexclSACU  EU_25  restofworld 
Electricity  -2.70  3.78  4.00  -3.41  0.46 
Grains and crops  0.20  -0.08  -0.11  -0.08  -0.02 
 
Livestock and meat products 
-0.12  -0.10  -0.03  -0.21  -0.01 
Mining and extraction  -0.45  -0.11  -0.10  0.01  -0.06 
Processed food  -0.04  -0.16  -0.20  -0.23  -0.03 
Textiles and clothing  0.25  0.35  -0.66  -0.01  -0.19 
Light Manufacturing  0.05  -0.13  -0.34  -0.26  -0.03 
Heavy Manufacturing  -0.20  0.33  -0.46  -0.34  0.03 
Utilities and construction  -1.36  0.29  0.44  -0.84  0.31 
Transport and communication  -0.07  0.03  -0.13  -0.22  0.00 
Other services  -0.21  -0.05  -0.12  -0.21  -0.01 
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